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CASES NOTED
since Miranda v. Arizona47 has the Court been so vigorously accused of
judicial legislation. However, in spite of the opinion's technical infirmities,




Defendants offered for sale to the public unique forms of self-im-
provement courses called "Adventures" and "Plans." In return for an
investment of from one to five thousand dollars, purchasers received
certain promotional materials, the opportunity to attend group seminars,
and the right to enroll in a training course--all of which were geared to
indoctrinating purchasers in the technique of selling "Dare To Be Great"
courses to others. After completion of the training course, purchasers
became "independent sales trainees," eligible to earn commissions from
sales made by defendants to individuals whom the purchaser had brought
to the "Adventure Meetings." The Securities and Exchange Commission
sought to enjoin defendants from offering these schemes for sale, claiming
violation of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The Commission
charged that these courses were part of a pyramid promotional sales plan
which constituted an investment contract and, as such, a security within
the meaning of the federal securities laws.8 The Commission likened de-
fendant to a double-level franchising operation in which the success of
each individual franchisee is inextricably tied to the success of the entire
franchising system.' Unless investors are given the opportunity to exercise
practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the entire
enterprise, the Commission argued, such investors should be afforded
47. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(g), (j), (k), (q), (t), (w) (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(c), (1), (r), (u), (z) (1970).
3. The Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, c9lateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional un-
divided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added). The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
defines "security" in virtually the same language. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (a) (10) (1970).
4. See Applicability of the Securities Laws to Multi-Level Distributorship and Pyramid
Sales Plans, SEC Securities Act Release, No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII
the protection of the securities laws. The district court sustained this
argument and granted a preliminary injunction.5 On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed: A pyramid
sales plan where an investor is denied the opportunity to make those
"essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise"' is a security within the meaning of the Federal Securities laws.
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 94 S. Ct. 117 (1973).
Despite admonitions to the contrary 7 the instant decision represents,
at least on its face, a major departure from established federal notions of
a security concept.8 Traditionally, federal courts have defined an "invest-
ment contract" in terms of whether the investor actively participates in
the operations of the enterprise. The Ninth Circuit, however, has adopted
a far more expansive definition. Under the Turner test, the definition turns
on the quality of investor participation. This expanded definition could
have enormous regulatory consequences. If pursued vigorously by the
SEC, the new Turner test could bring within the ambit of federal securities
regulation heretofore unregulated industries, notably franchises, dealer-
ships, and distributorships. For, in each of these industries, the investor,
while contributing to the success of his own business, makes little input
into the managerial decision-making process of the larger corporate enter-
prise.
The underlying purpose of the federal securities laws is full and fair
disclosure relative to the issuance of securities. To carry out that purpose,
Congress defined the term "security" in broad and general terms so as
to include within the definition the many types of instruments that, in the
commercial world, fall within the concept of a security.' In addition to
commonly recognizable instruments such as notes, bonds, treasury stock,
and debentures, Congress included several catch-all terms such as "cer-
tificates of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement" and
"investment contracts."' These catch-all terms, while undefined by the
Acts, were intended to identify transactions which in reality involve the
same economic relationships as the more easily recognizable securities,
but happen to be clothed in some unfamiliar garb.
Traditionally, federal courts have characterized an investment con-
tract as essentially a profit-seeking venture in which a passive, relatively
uninformed, and geographically distant investor relies on the promoter or
a third person to manage the enterprise and to make a profit." In SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.,'2 these elements were incorporated by the Supreme
5. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
6. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) cert. denied,
94 S. Ct. 117 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Turner].
7. Id. at 483.
8. See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
9. H.R. REP. No. 89, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
10. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970).
11. See, e.g., SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941).
12. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) [hereinafter referred to as Howey].
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Court into a test which became the federal standard by which to judge
a security.
In Howey, the Court determined that a land sales contract for small
parcels of an orange grove, coupled with a service contract for marketing
the crop, constituted an investment contract under section 2 (1) of the
Securities Act of 1933. In so finding, the Court noted several factors. The
defendant had represented to the purchasers, mainly non-Floridian busi-
nessmen and professional people with neither experience in nor knowledge
of the citrus industry, that while substantial profits could be expected
from the sale of oranges, it was unfeasible to operate the parcels indi-
vidually. The service company offered to manage, cultivate, and sell the
oranges, remitting to each purchaser a pro-rata share of the annual profits.
Clearly, the Court reasoned, the two contracts were part of a single
corporate financing scheme in which the purchasers were attracted solely
by the chance to earn a good return on their investments. Thus, the Court
defined an investment contract as
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being imma-
terial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by
formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise."
This definition, the Court noted, was consistent with both prior state
and federal court decisions and with statutory aims.'4 It merely reduced
to definitional form a legislative term, the meaning of which had been
"crystallized" by prior judicial interpretation."5
The Howey test 6 received widespread judicial approval and has
been cited and quoted in holding many kinds of fund-raising schemes as
falling within the purview of the federal securities acts.' 7 However, while
Howey became the federal standard for interpreting the reach of the fed-
eral securities laws, some state courts held that Howey did not go far
enough in protecting the investor. To broaden the scope of state securities
regulation, state courts developed the "risk-capital" theory. The theory
was first enunciated by the Supreme Court of California in Silver Hills
13. Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 298.
15. Id. But see Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971), wherein the author contends, upon
examination of the authorities relied on in Howey, that there had been no uniform state
definition of an investment contract.
16. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). "The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." Id.
at 301.
17. See Annot., 3 A.L.R. FED. 592 (1970), and cases cited therein. In Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), the Supreme Court applied the Howey test to the definition
of an investment contract under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Court
held that a withdrawable capital share in a state-chartered savings and loan association was
an investment contract under section 3(a)(10) of the Act, and thus a security subject to
Rule 10b-5.
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Country Club v. Sobieski, 8 a case involving the promotion of a country
club. There, the promoters had entered into an installment contract to
purchase a 22-acre ranch to be used as the site. They made a token down
payment of $400 on the property, which was valued at $775,000. To raise
the rest of the money necessary to finance the venture, the partners sold
memberships in the newly-founded club. These memberships were held to
be securities.
Justice Traynor, writing for the majority in Silver Hills, noted that
a recurring feature in many investment schemes is the solicitation of funds
for speculative, poorly-financed business ventures. In these instances, the
investor, even if he can participate in or control some phase of the enter-
prise, is gambling "risk capital," in that there is a less than even chance
of success although there is the opportunity for a large return on his
investment. Because of the substantial risk of loss, to include such opera-
tions within the scope of the state securities acts would fulfill the purpose
of protecting passive investors by compelling the disclosure of the dis-
quieting aspects of the scheme.
The "risk-capital" theory thus shifted the emphasis in California
from the promise of future profits to the risk of loss of the initial invest-
ment. Under this view, once the requisite risk is shown, the question of
active investor participation becomes irrelevant. 9 While the "risk-capital"
theory has recently been adopted, in varying forms, by several state
courts,2" and has the qualified support of at least one federal district
court,21 it is questionable whether it is applicable under the federal secu-
18. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (membership in a country
club with no legal rights thereto held to be a security) [hereinafter referred to as Silver
Hills].
19. Some courts have expanded on the Silver Hills decision and have defined an invest-
ment contract by combining the "risk-capital" theory with some watered-down elements of
the Howey test. In State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971),
the Supreme Court of Hawaii in determining that a founder-membership contract consti-
tuted an investment contract, held that an investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or rep-
resentations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable
benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree
as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109. Although adopting the "risk-capital" theory, the Hawaii Market
Center test seems to turn, as does the Turner test, on the managerial-decision making power
of the investor. For a more in depth treatment of the "risk-capital" theory, see Mofsky,
The Expanding Definition of a "Security" Under the Blue Sky Laws, 1 SEc. REG. L.J. 217
(1973).
20. State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); State
ex rel. Park v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 BLuE SKY L. REP. 71,023 (4th Jud.
Dist. Idaho 1972); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Ore. Ct. App.
19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
21. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd
460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). Compare Venture Investment Co., Inc. v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE
SKY L. REP. R 71,031 (D. Colo. 1972).
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rities laws, 2 especially since the theory's underpinning has been expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court.23
In Turner, the district court held "Dare To Be Great" to be a secu-
rity, basing its decision, in large part, on the "risk-capital" theory.24 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit sidestepped the thorny problem of applying the
risk-capital" theory by addressing itself exclusively to the question of
whether "Dare To Be Great" constituted an investment contract under a
flexible interpretation of the Howey test.
The Ninth Circuit took the view that, despite the settled application
of the Howey test in federal courts, adherence to such an interpretation
would result "in a mechanical, unduly restrictive view of what is and what
is not an investment contract, ' 25 thereby frustrating the broad purpose
of the securities acts. In particular, the court pointed out that insistence
on the requirement that profits come solely from the efforts of others
would create inevitable loopholes. Promoters could then evade the reach
of the federal securities acts by simply requiring investors to contribute
a modicum of effort. Consequently, the court admonished that the mere
fact that an investor participates to some small degree should not auto-
matically preclude a finding that the scheme is an investment contract. 20
The more realistic test, the court opined, is whether the investor makes
those essential managerial efforts which significantly affect the enterprise.
Under this liberal approach, the court had little trouble determining
that "Dare To Be Great" was a security. Purchasers, the court noted,
although actively recruiting prospects to attend "Dare To Be Great"
meetings, were really relying on Turner's professional salesmen to put
the scheme over. For it was Turner's salesmen who ran the meetings and
persuaded the prospects that "Dare" was a "sure route to great riches. 27
22. The "risk-capital" theory was adopted by state courts construing state securities
laws. Since these laws regulate the merits of publicly offered securities, it is entirely appro-
priate for them to be concerned with the "riskiness" of a new business promotion. Federal
securities laws, on the other hand, are unconcerned with the merits of an offering. Federal
securities laws merely provide for full and fair disclosure. Thus, it would be inconsistent
for federal laws to adopt the "risk-capital" theory, since that theory is grounded on the
policy of merit regulation.
23. "It is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or non-speculative . .. .
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946), cited in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 345 (1967). But see Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a
More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RS. L. REv. 367, 381-82 (1967), wherein the author
argues that risk of loss was tacitly recognized in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943).
24. The district court stated that "the Supreme Court has indicated that it is appro-
priate to look to state law to give content to the terms used in the definition .... " SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 773 (D. Ore. 1972). This statement
is taken out of context and is misleading. The 1946 Court in Howey looked to state court
decisions pre-1933 to garner an interpretation of what Congress had meant in 1933 when
it used the term "investment contract." It would be inappropriate for federal courts to
look to current state decisions to give meaning to a term as used in 1933.
25. 474 F.2d at 482.
26. See Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953) (uncited by the Ninth
Circuit Turner opinion).
27. 474 F.2d at 479.
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In essence, the court concluded, those who bought "Adventures," and
thereby the right to earn commissions, were really buying the right to
share in the selling efforts of the professional salesmen, without whose
efforts the scheme would have failed. To get that share, the purchasers
invested three things: their money; their efforts to find prospects and
bring them to the meetings; and whatever it cost them to create a suffi-
cient appearance of instant affluence to lure others to join the venture.28
Submitted to close scrutiny, the court's reasoning appears flawed.
From a factual standpoint, the court assumed that non-managerial efforts
are insignificant to the success of a venture. However, in a scheme such
as "Dare To Be Great," the role of the purchaser-salesmen appears to
have been essential; for without their solicitations, sales and profits would
have dried up entirely. 9 Additionally, the court intentionally played down
the purchasers' active role. The court implied that purchasers contributed
only a modicum of effort, when in fact, the record disclosed that pur-
chasers put in long hours seeking out prospects and attending meetings.8"
From a legal standpoint, the court's reasoning is equally assailable.
First, even assuming a flexible interpretation of Howey is possible, the
court's adoption of the Turner test, based on essential managerial efforts,
appears to go far beyond what Congress intended the securities acts to
reach."' Additionally, the court's bald assertion that its test is more "real-
istic" than Howey's is unsupported by any federal decisions,82 save for
the district court's opinion. There, without citation, Judge Skopil asserted
that "[t]he most essential consistency in the cases which have considered
the meaning of 'investment contract' is the emphasis on whether or not
the investor has substantial power to affect the success of the enterprise." 3
This is simply not so. As one commentator has noted, the cases have al-
most unanimously interpreted the Howey test to mean that "any effort,
physical or otherwise, exerted by the investor, regardless of whether this
effort has any bearing on the control of the enterprise," 4 would disqualify
a scheme as a security.
In place of rigorous analysis, the Ninth Circuit relied on imprecise
and overbroad maxims of statutory construction which could stand for
almost any desired proposition.8" Moreover, the court's reliance on three
28. The idea that an investment can include labor as well as money was given support
in Murphy v. Dare To Be Great, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,053 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1972).
Accord, Goodwin, Franchising Law Matures, 28 Bus. LAw. 703 (1973).
29. In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973), decided
on similar facts, a district court agreed and held no security. An appeal from the Koscot
decision is presently pending before the Fifth Circuit.
30. Brief for Appellant at 18, 474 F.2d 476.
31. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
32. However, a few state court decisions are in accord with the instant case. See, e.g.,
State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
33. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ore. 1972).
34. Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Se-
curities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135, 145 (1971).
35. "We hold, however, that in light of the remedial nature of the legislation, the
statutory policy of affording broad protection to the public, and the Supreme Court's ad-
monitions that the definition of securities should be a flexible one . . . ." 474 F.2d at 482.
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"Blue Sky" decisions36 holding "Dare To Be Great" to be a security, is
unjustified, 7 especially since they were decided under the "risk-capital"
theory. Interestingly, the court ignored its own very recent precedent in
which the Howey test had been reaffirmed. 8
While the court's conclusion-that Howey intended "efforts" to mean
managerial, policy-making efforts-is supported by a number of com-
mentators3 9 and, to some extent, by the language in Howey itself,4" the
court made no attempt to develop this critical point.41 Further, the court
avoided a discussion of the fact that purchasers of the "Dare To Be
Great" courses did not actually participate in the profits of the company.
Rather, they earned fixed commissions from their sales, regardless of
whether the sales proved profitable to the company.42
In the opinion of this writer, Turner is a short-sighted decision which
was fashioned to destroy "a gigantic and successful fraud."44 In so
doing, the Ninth Circuit may have worked an unwarranted extension of
the federal securities laws. The Turner test, if permitted to stand, will
36. Hurst v. Dare To Be Great, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,012 (D. Ore. 1971), aff'd
474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Frye v. Taylor, 263 So.2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) ; State ex
rel. Park v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,023 (4th Jud.
Dist. Idaho 1972).
37. As the Supreme Court stated in Tcherepnin v. Knight: "[Fiederal law must govern
whether [withdrawable capital] shares ... constitute securities under the Securities Exchange
Act." 389 U.S. 332, 337-38 (1967).
38. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969), in which a
"turn-key" operation into which the investor merely stepped, becoming immediately involved
in a substantial and profitable undertaking with a minimum obligation on his own time,
was held not to be a security. See also Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp.
640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972), where the franchisee had so little
control that he could not select his own local manager; likewise held not to be a security.
39. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 367 (1967); Goodwin, Franchising Law Matures, 28 Bus.
LAW. 703 (1973); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135 (1971).
40. This is evidenced in the following two passages: "A common enterprise managed
by respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential
if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investments." SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (emphasis added). Later the Court stated:
"Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The investors
provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promoters manage, control
and operate the enterprise .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
41. The Turner decision is grounded on the assumption that an investor who is actively
engaged in the management of a company is able to protect himself and does not need reg-
ulatory assistance. In theory, however, the most efficient allocation of resources would be to
leave the management of a company's affairs to those best suited to the job, namely the
managers. It would seem axiomatic that if untrained and unsophisticated investors were
encouraged to engage in the management of a company, the company would be run less
efficiently, thereby increasing the riskiness of the investment.
42. This point proved critical in a number of cases holding no security. See Gallon v.
Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So.2d 841 (1968) ; Georgia Mkt. Centers, Inc.
v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); Emery v. So-Soft, Inc., 30 Ohio Op. 2d 226,
199 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Sec. Comm'n v. Consumers
Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v.
King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
43. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972).
44. 474 F.2d at 478.
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subject franchises, distributorships and similar enterprises to costly and
onerous registration requirements which were previously not applicable.
In discounting non-managerial efforts as insignificant, the Turner test may
not have accurately reflected business realities. In 1970, the then General
Counsel to the Securities and Exchange Commission, testifying before
the Senate Select Committee on Small Businesses, expressed the view that,
generally, franchises should not be considered securities because their
success depends, in large measure, on the joint labor of the franchisor
and franchisee.45 It is submitted that the instant decision was colored by
the defendant's fraud. Hopefully, its rule will be restricted, as here, to
inherently fraudulent promotions.
MIcHAEL PRESS
PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Respondents1 filed an application in the Patent Office on a pro-
grammed conversion2 of numerical information in general purpose digital
computers for use in the transmission of telephone signals.8 Their claim,
a method for converting binary-coded-in decimal numbers into pure binary
numerals, covered any use of the method in any type of digital computer.'
Pursuant to a policy decision of the Patent Office, the claims were rejected
by both the examiner and the Patent Office Board of Appeals as being
"non-statutory subject matter." The Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals (C.C.P.A.) reversed5 and allowed the claims as fitting within the
45. SEC. REo. & L. REP. A-8 (April 29, 1970).
1. Amicus briefs of sixteen groups were filed. Gottschalk v. Benson, 93 S. Ct. 253, 258
n.7 (1972). The issue of patentability of computer programs has split the computer industry
into two factions. On one hand, the hardware manufacturers are against extending protection
to programs on the ground that it might hurt computer sales and for fear that widespread
and efficient distribution of new programming techniques will be inhibited. On the other
hand, software companies, whose sole product consists of computer programs, favor patent
protection on the ground that lack of it discourages growth and marketability of their
programs. Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright
Laws, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1541, 1547 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 81 HARVARD].
2. A computer program is basically a set of mathematical instructions which direct the
inner workings of the computer hardware. Programs are writtten in one of several computer
languages such as COBAL, FORTRAN, and ALGOL, which may be used with almost any
general purpose digital computer. Programs are also written in "machine language," that is,
the language peculiar to each type of computer. Different applications will warrant the use
of the different languages.
3. The program was developed for and assigned to Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.
See Computers: Hard Ruling for Software-Victory for Hardware, TwEx, Dec. 4, 1972,
at 46.
4. See notes 45 & 46 infra.
5. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
